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East Asia is now widely regarded as the focus of the world's
attention. 1 Since the end of the Cold War, East Asia has entered into an
era of comprehensive engagements, triggered in particular by China's
constructive and peaceful rise and the region's reply to the challenge of
the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The security, political, and
economic maps of East Asia have been transformed, and an
institutionalized framework for regional cooperation, represented by the
"ten-plus-three" process (the ten members of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan and South Korea) and
the East Asia Summit, is emerging. East Asia is surging economically,
and this development helps explain why experts perceive that power
and influence in international relations are shifting toward Asia. What
happens to order in East Asia will significantly affect the role Asia plays
in the emergence of any Asia-centric international system. Thus, it is
appropriate to think about the future of the East Asian order, and the
most important relationship for this future is between China and Japan.
This article's analysis proceeds in five parts. First, I provide an
overview of order in the East Asian region, emphasizing the importance
of economic integration and the pivotal role of Sino-Japanese relations
in the formation of a new type of order in East Asia.
Second, the article considers some conceptual and definitional issues
concerning order formation in international relations. Specifically, I look
at definitions of international order and examine some new aspects of
order formation in the early twenty-first century, which I call power
shift, problem shift, and paradigm shift. These developments affect the
* KF Chair Professor and Deputy Director of the Center of International Strategic
Studies, Party School of CPC Central Committee. The views expressed here are solely
mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the Central Party School.
1. For purposes of this article, "East Asia" encompasses the countries of Northeast
Asia and Southeast Asia.
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logic of regional order formation generally and in East Asia specifically.
Third, I explore the dynamics of the evolving East Asian order. I
begin with a look at past and present orders in East Asia and then
analyze the five key features of order formation in East Asia: (1) the
importance of economic integration and its spillover effects, (2) the
comprehensive and peaceful rise of China, (3) Japan's pursuit of greater
political roles regionally and globally, (4) the leading role played in East
Asian order formation by ASEAN, and (5) strategic adjustments being
made by the United States.
Fourth, I consider the future of the East Asian order and argue that
the key to its further development revolves around the relationship
between China and Japan.
Finally, I outline a strategic framework for future Sino-Japanese
relations based on the convergence and institutionalization of their
common interests bilaterally, regionally, and globally. This framework
takes into account the complexity of Sino-Japanese relations, identifies
the common interests in which a strategic framework can be grounded,
and looks at possible strategic measures China and Japan can take to
move East Asian order formation forward.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE EAST ASIAN ORDER
A. The Importance of East Asian Economic Integration
Rapid economic integration in East Asia has proved to be the main
catalyst of regional cooperation. The pace of economic integration
indicates that the region is a natural trade territory, but this
integration has increasingly facilitated regional cooperation beyond
trade and investment. Economic integration has produced spillover
effects in the form of political and security dialogues, functional
coordination in some areas of low politics, and intensive social
interactions among countries in the region. As the East Asian order
matures, politics-especially political considerations at the strategic
level-will drive regional cooperation, coordination, and integration.
Since the end of the Cold War, economic integration in East Asia
has seen steady progress. Even the bitter experience of the Asian
financial crisis in the late 1990s triggered comprehensive efforts toward
better economic and financial coordination. Thus, trade, investment,
and financial cooperation have been enhanced. In the early years of the
twenty-first century, free trade agreements (FTAs), both bilateral and
multilateral, have become an important trend in East Asian economic
integration. However, the difficulties China and Japan have
experienced in negotiating a bilateral FTA shows that FTAs in East
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Asia do not constitute a framework for regional cooperation that
encompasses all economies. The institutional aspects of regional
economic cooperation have, therefore, lagged behind the substantive
integration that has taken place between East Asian economies.
Politics and economics interact, and political factors have observable
effects on economics. 2 Economic integration is not only an attempt to
increase economic growth and achieve other economic objectives, but it
is also an effort to regain some measure of political control over
economic globalization, which has constrained national policy
instruments. 3 Economic interdependence, by itself, is insufficient to
establish a steady regional order in East Asia. Such interdependence
does not operate at the nation-state level, nor does it necessarily require
the creation of security arrangements, features that any sustainable
regional order or community must exhibit.
Regionalism provides East Asian countries with not only the
opportunity for economic integration but also the impetus for political
dialogues and security cooperation. The ten-plus-three framework is the
main channel of East Asian economic and political cooperation. This
framework is transforming from a market-driven mechanism into an
arrangement where economic, political, and security institutions are
becoming more prominent. ASEAN countries have set up a
comparatively mature subregional order in Southeast Asia, while the
three Northeast Asian countries-China, Japan, and South Korea-
have promised through the ten-plus-three framework to enhance
political trust among themselves and with ASEAN members.
However, these developing political dialogues and cooperative
efforts have only managed to address problems remaining from past
political confrontations and other long term security problems. The slow
progress made on political and security issues is exacerbated by the fact
that countries in East Asia think nationally, talk regionally, and yet
always act bilaterally. Thus, the development of a positive, strategic
framework for order in East Asia is still wanting.
Nevertheless, as East Asia enters into a new era of engagement, the
predominant trend there is toward boosting interdependence among
countries. Cooperation and cooperative development have become the
focus of a common vision for the future of East Asia, and a community
2. See James D. Morrow et al., The Political Determinants of International Trade: The
Major Powers, 1907-90, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 649, 649 (1998); Susan Strange, Political
Economy and International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY TODAY 154,
169-70 (Ken Booth & Steve Smith eds., 1995).
3. Peter J. Katzenstein & Takashi Shiraishi, Conclusion: Regions in World Politics:
Japan and Asia-Germany in Europe, in NETWORK POWER: JAPAN AND ASIA 341, 344 (Peter
J. Katzenstein & Takashi Shiraishi eds., 1997).
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dedicated to coexistence and joint prosperity is emerging within the
overall development of economic interdependence and in response to the
growing severity of some nontraditional security problems.
B. A New East Asian Order Under Formation
A formal, institutionalized East Asian Community is a lofty goal
promising a bright future for regional order, but this goal remains very
distant. Order in East Asia is a traditional but crucial component of
analyzing the prospects for regional integration, although the concept
faded after the Second World War because of historical legacies (e.g.,
Japan's aggression during the 1930s and 1940s) and intervention from
great powers outside the region (e.g., the United States). Great powers
talk frequently about global or international order, but regional orders
are the pillars of the global one, and a chaotic order in East Asia would
be a severe problem for these same powers and for global order in the
future.
In the early stages of East Asian integration, economics united
nations, but politics divided them. The complexity of East Asian power
relations made political cooperation difficult. This difficulty stemmed
from the competing interests of relevant actors inside and outside the
region, as well as from the asymmetries and rapid changes in the power
profiles of these actors. Yet, gradually, the spillover effects of economic
interdependence pushed forward more regional cooperation and a
greater momentum for regionalism generally. The norms and
institutions that have been emerging through efforts on regional
economic integration have helped East Asian countries to mitigate
intraregional power asymmetries that would otherwise aggravate the
security dilemma existing among them.4 Meanwhile, a patchwork of
bilateral alliances, ad hoc security dialogues, multilateral forums,
ministerial meetings, track two encounters, and other mechanisms of
engagement developed across the region.5 Although political mistrust
and security distrust still impede more comprehensive regional
cooperation, most countries involved realize that the route to future
order building in East Asia is not through hegemony or war, but
through the convergence and institutionalization of common interests
among them.
4. Amitav Acharya, Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?, IN'L. SECURITY, Winter 2003-04,
at 149, 150.
5. G. John Ikenberry & Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Between Balance of Power and
Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific, 2 INT'L
REL. ASIA-PAC. 69, 70 (2002).
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In essence, order formation is a process of common interest
convergence and institutionalization. Japan and China are the two
crucial pillars of East Asian integration and of any stable East Asian
order. Before the mid-1990s, East Asia had no regionwide institutional
framework for economic integration. At that time, Japanese investment
in East Asia was largely responsible for the growing common prosperity
in the region. However, the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis triggered
more concerted efforts at regional economic cooperation and, since that
crisis, the Chinese economy has assumed the role of leading regional
economic integrator. Yet, in the process of East Asian order formation,
ASEAN has played the leading role because it has provided the
framework within which the leading East Asian powers have cooperated
on both political and security issues. In addition, ASEAN and the
United States play counterbalancing roles in the formation of an East
Asian order.
Deeper levels of cooperation in East Asia emerged in economics and
functional low politics issue areas and from the challenges created by
the Asian financial crisis. East Asian cooperation is now at a crossroads
because the great powers in the region-Japan and China-need to
determine what types of political and security cooperation they wish to
develop.
C. Sino-Japanese Relations: The Pivotal Factor of East Asian Order
As important as ASEAN has been in playing a leading role in
facilitating greater cooperation among East Asian countries, its ability
to push East Asian order formation farther and faster is very limited.
The keys to such order formation are reconciliation, cooperation, and
coordination between China and Japan.
China's economic rise and Japan's political rise are the principal
catalysts to the emerging regional order, but the mistrust between
China and Japan is a daunting obstacle facing East Asian order
formation. The "Two Tigers Dilemma"-no two rival tigers can exist in
the same territory-makes it difficult for the two countries to identify
and institutionalize common interests. Sino-Japanese competition
profoundly affects the process of regional, economic institution building
in all core dimensions: the nature of preferential trade ties between
Northeast and Southeast Asian nations, the proliferation of overlapping
FTA networks, and the rekindled debate on the inclusivity and
exclusivity of economic integration processes. On security issues, a
traditional security dilemma between the two countries exists, which
makes it difficult to foster mutual trust, mutual benefit, and
interdependence. Strategic mistrust between the two countries sharpens
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the East Asian security dilemma and hinders multilateral security
institution building.
Certainly, the future of any East Asian order depends on the nature
of Sino-Japanese relations. Avoiding or resolving the "Two Tigers
Dilemma" is necessary to facilitate more stable East Asian order
building. How Japan and China move forward will also determine how
the shift of power and influence toward Asia will operate and be
perceived by other countries. Japan and China will thus determine what
happens to East Asia at its present strategic crossroads.
II. THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL ORDER FORMATION
A. Definitions of International Order
Hedley Bull defined international order as "a pattern of activity that
sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or
international society."6 Bull identified three sets of rules necessary to
maintain order: principled or constitutive rules (the system of states as
the foundation for order), rules of coexistence (states respect the
sovereignty of other states), and rules of cooperation (legal and other
rules that govern interaction among states and societies). 7 G. John
Ikenberry defined international political order as the governing
arrangements among a group of states: "The focus is on the explicit
principles, rules, and institutions that define the core relationships
between the states that are party to the order. This limits the concept of
order to settled arrangements between states that define their
relationships to each other and mutual expectations about their ongoing
interaction."8 In Ikenberry's view, institutions both limit and project
state power, thus playing a key role in order building and
maintenance. 9
International order, this article submits, is based on the power
relations among great powers in any given period of time, and it flows
from the distribution of power and interests between and among the
great powers. The stability of an international order depends on
6. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 8
(1977).
7. Id. at 67-70.
8. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND
THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 23 (2001).
9. Institutionalists argue that institutions can enable states to achieve their own
objectives more efficiently and that order can be maintained through an ever-growing set
of agreements and institutions. See generally EXPLORATION AND CONTESTATION IN THE
STUDY OF WORLD POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein et al., eds., 1999).
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whether the great powers can come to terms on the core ideas or
conceptions of the order. 10 International institutions or regimes, which
include principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, are
the crucial variables in order formation.
International order is usually facilitated by the building and
functioning of international institutions. International order is a kind of
public good, which is provided by the most powerful and important
states in international society, and it both reflects and leads to
cooperation and conflict among great powers. Nevertheless, order
formation is always based on common interest convergence and
institutionalization. In Charles P. Kindleberger's view, public goods can
play the role of stabilizer in international order and their
underproduction on the international level is a serious problem. 1 1
Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. argue that hegemony is not
the sole provider of public goods, but a few great powers can provide
public goods, thus stabilizing international order. 12
International order among states has taken many different forms,
but balance-of-power, hegemonic, and community-based orders are the
most important. In the balance-of-power order, the power of the leading
state is counterbalanced by the powers of other states, with coalitions
shifting as power distributions change. A hegemonic order is organized
and maintained by a state wielding a predominance of power
capabilities. This dominant power shapes the international order in
which relations between states are stable and follow certain patterns
and rules of behavior determined by the dominant power.13 A
community-based order exists where binding security institutions and
shared political interests and values shape the way states exercise
power; the distribution of power may still matter, but not to the same
extent as in balance of power or hegemonic orders. 14
B. New Dynamics of Order Formation: Power Shift, Problem Shift, and
Paradigm Shift
Order is always in the process of transformation as great powers
rise and fall. Since the end of the Cold War, or even since the end of
Second World War, with globalization and regionalization surging in
10. See Albert S. Yee, The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies, 50 INT'L ORG. 69 (1996).
11. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, International Public Goods without International
Government, in THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 123, 125 (1988).
12. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 18-19
(3d. ed. 2001).
13. A. F. K. ORGANSIU, WORLD POLITICS 313-30 (1958).
14. Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama, supra note 5, at 87-90.
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differently timed waves, new dynamics of order formation emerge,
namely power shift, problem shift, and paradigm shift. 15
1. Power Shifts
"Power shift" describes the way that globalization and regional
integration have transformed the actors and the configuration of power
internationally. Regionalism and regionalization have become both
generators and accumulators of power resources for states. With the
expansion of globalization, self-reliance by states is not regarded as a
realistic choice. Regional economic cooperation, followed by economic
integration, have become new global trends and are regarded as the
great powers' strategic choices. The world has entered a third century of
rapid growth driven by science and technology. Accordingly, economics
and technology, instead of politics, war, and security, have played an
increasingly dominant role in order formation.
Globalization and regionalism have factored into many important
power shifts that have occurred over the past few decades: Japan's
economic and political rise since the 1980s, the hegemony of the United
States in the immediate post-Cold War period, and the economic and
political development of China, India, Russia, and Brazil. The nature of
these power shifts involves not just hard power but, increasingly, the
utilization of soft power in international relations. Another power shift
encouraged by globalization has been the growth in the power and
influence of nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations,
nongovernmental organizations, and terrorist and criminal groups.16 Of
course, these power shifts have also contributed to order-threatening
problems, such as state failure,1 7 which create new kinds of challenges
for maintaining and deepening international and regional stability.
2. Problem Shifts
Along with power shifts, countries must deal with shifting problems.
Some newly emerging problems or issues stand out as new priorities on
international agendas, and these challenges have grown as national
concerns in terms of their security, political influence, and economic
15. See Men Honghua, Power Shift, Problem Shift and Paradigm Shift: A Study of the
Hegemonic Explanation Model, AM. STUD. Q., Fall 2005, at 7 (analyzing the transmutation
of the world and U.S. hegemony and the theoretical model in explaining this U.S.
hegemony).
16. Jessica Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 50.
17. See Men Honghua, Remedial Measures for Failed States: A Strategic Dimension of
Sino-American Security Cooperation, AM. STUD. Q., Spring 2004, at 7.
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development and prosperity.
First, more global issues have emerged. Terrorism, drug and arms
smuggling, public health and environmental problems, resource scarcity
and depletion, migration and other human flows across national borders
are all worldwide problems, which can only be effectively addressed
with the cooperation and coordination of many countries. The great
powers alone cannot resolve these global problems. 18 Accordingly, global
issues blur traditional internal and external boundaries and require a
level of understanding of the national interests of others. Thus, global
problems act as restraints on the great powers and can strengthen the
sense of solidarity in the international community. 19
Second, the emergence of more global problems has increased the
importance of finding new ways of cooperating globally and regionally.
Many global problems threaten economic development and security, and
they entangle science, technology, information, ecology, and other issues
in security discussions. As nontraditional security problems, these
global challenges can facilitate a more cooperative relationship in
achieving national, regional, and global security.
Third, the need for new solutions and innovative regimes to address
global problems highlights existing problems with international
institutions, such as their "democratic deficit," and many countries,
including the great powers, have begun to reevaluate their significance
and potential contributions to order formation and stabilization.
3. Paradigm Shifts
Power and problem shifts suggest that international affairs should
undergo some paradigm shifts in how states and nonstate actors
analyze and behave in world affairs. For great powers, globalization and
regionalization act as constructive strategic straitjackets, making the
pursuit of national interests more a matter of relative than absolute
18. Dennis C. Blair & John T. Hanley, Jr., From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-
Pacific Security Arrangements, WASH. Q., Winter 2001, at 7, 8; see also Tsuneo Akaha,
Non-traditional Security Cooperation for Regionalism in Northeast Asia, in BROADENING
ASIA'S SECURITY DISCOURSE AND AGENDA: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES 306 (Ramesh Thakur & Edward Newman eds., 2004) (arguing that
multilateral cooperation over nontraditional security issues will contribute to the building
of mutual confidence in Northeast Asia); Men Honghua, New Security Concept, Interest
Community and Strategic Thoroughfare: An Explanation to China's Security Interest,
TEACHING & RES., Aug. 2004, at 68 (supporting the development of an international
interest community between China and other nations to accelerate the integration of
China into international society).
19. Jean-Marie Guehenno, The Impact of Globalization on Strategy, SURVIVAL, Winter
1998-99, at 5, 8.
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gains.20 The need to address global challenges and nontraditional
security threats makes power relations among countries look less like
zero-sum games and more like opportunities to create positive-sum or
win-win collective solutions. In the regional perspective, open
regionalism is widely accepted, and regional structures and regimes
focused on functional issues could produce a more durable order with
liberal principles operating as constitutive rules.
Table 1. Power Shift, Problem Shift, and Paradigm Shift
Power Shift Problem Shift Paradigm Shift
Rise of NGOs, Domestic reform Domestic





of national agendas expand replaces
Bilateral power; and become more confrontation,




Regionalism and More regional Regional
regionalization conflicts are cooperation and
become both avoided; integration are
Regional generators and Traditional and more important;
Level accumulators of nontraditional Regionalism has
power resources security counterbalancing




Rise of new great security deficit of
powers; problems; international
Global Economy and North-South institutions;
Level technology play conflict replaces Global
more dominant East-West governance.
roles. conflict as the
main concern.
20. Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell & Duncan Snidal, The Relative-Gains Problem for
International Cooperation, 87 AM. POL. SCd. REV. 729, 729 (1993).
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C. The Logic of Regional Order Formation
International order is often treated as a byproduct of military
threats, and the possibility of nonviolent international orders that
develop as a byproduct of interstate collective identity is typically
regarded as uncertain.2 1 Yet, regionalism and its spillover effects can
affect how we think about order formation. In reality, regional order
formation depends not only on power relations and the self-interest of
the countries involved, but also on such process factors as idea
innovation, collective identity, and institution building. Robert Cox
argues that any international order is the interaction of three forces:
power distribution, the role of institutions, and collective identity, with
consistency among the three forces contributing to a stable, preferred
order.22
In regional order formation, economic integration is always
regarded as the bellwether of regional cooperation. Cooperation,
coordination, and compromise become mainstream behaviors in the
integration process; and rules, norms, principles, and coordinative
decision making procedures gradually become accepted by all
participants and are institutionalized as the hard and soft laws of the
region.
These institutionalized factors typically include the following items:
(1) reciprocity, which means that participating states pursue not only
self-interests, but the common interests of the whole region; (2)
progressiveness, which means displaying tolerance and patience while
waiting for consensus to form; (3) inclusivity and openness to outside
actors, which accepts involvement by states located in different regions;
(4) multilateral coordination and traditional bilateralism, which work
simultaneously; and (5) reinsurance arrangements, such as cooperative
security arrangements. All the factors above reflect the pursuit of
common interests, and the formation and maintenance of these common
interests should be regarded as the principium of the regional
community. Since distributions of power are usually uneven or
asymmetric within regions, small or weak states can, through
regionalism, counterbalance regional great powers. Conversely, the
coordination, cooperation, and compromise of great powers are essential
to regional order formation, and great powers generally mitigate
suspicion by providing regional public goods and seeking strategic trust
with smaller and weaker states.
21. Janice Bially Mattern, The Power Politics of Identity, 7 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 349, 349
(2001).
22. See Robert Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 204 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986).
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The convergence and institutionalization of common interests is the
only workable way to build a constructive regional order. Common
interests not only refer to the interest in gaining mutual benefits but
also to the need to address common global challenges. No country in the
world can ward off present-day terrorism, the drug threat, and other
transborder challenges at a time of intensifying globalization of
political, economic, and social processes. In this context, the pressing
need for broad collaboration among all countries, both at the regional
and global levels, and for a practical contribution of each nation toward
the solution of these global problems are beyond doubt. In sum,
formation of a constructive regional order should be based on the
convergence of common interests between and among regional states.
III. DYNAMICS OF THE EVOLVING EAST ASIAN ORDER
Countries in East Asia have a long history of trying to create
regional order. Today, East Asian states embrace both the globalization
and regionalization waves, and, in the process, are beginning to think
about the future framework of the regional order. Regional economic
integration and its spillover effects, China's comprehensive and peaceful
rise as a great power, Japan's political pursuit of a greater role both in
regional and world arenas, ASEAN's normative influences, and the
United States' strategic adjustments in the region, are the main forces
that will affect East Asian order formation and determine not only the
openness of the regional order, but also the process and roadmap of its
building.
A. East Asian Order: Past and Present
The idea of regional cooperation in Asia has a long history, and the
pursuit of an East Asian order has rich, yet heavy, historical legacies.
The three most important attempts before the Second World War to
create order within East Asia were ancient China's Tribute System, the
United States' Open Door Policy, and Japan's Greater Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. 23
In ancient times, China played the leading role in the formation of a
regional East Asian order. The imperial "Tribute System" was a
culturally based hierarchical order in which the Celestial Empire
provided such public goods as political authorization, concessionary
23. See NORMAN PALMER, THE NEW REGIONALISM IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 45 (1991)
(quoting ROy KIM & HILARY CONROY, NEW TIDES IN THE PACIFIC: PACIFIC BASIN
COOPERATION AND THE BIG FOuR (JAPAN, PRC, USA, USSR) (1987)).
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trade opportunities, and security guarantees to the feudatory
neighboring states, which paid tribute and submitted to the supremacy
of China. China's supremacy and Sino-centrism were reflected not only
in cultural exchanges but also in political structures and economic
interactions. Invasion and colonization by Western industrial countries
caused the collapse of the Chinese Tribute System in the middle of the
nineteenth century, which led to the United States' push for the Open
Door Policy by the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth
century. However, the Open Door Policy was a balance-of-power order
that served the interests of outside imperial powers rather than the
wishes of the countries of East Asia. The Greater Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere pursued by Japan in the 1930s and 1940s was also an unequal,
colonial arrangement, which was perpetrated by the leading Asian
power of that time.
Both China's Tribute System and Japan's Greater Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere were hegemonic orders. The main difference between
them was that China's Tribute System was dominated by the belief in
Chinese cultural supremacy, while Japan's Greater Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere was dominated by military conquest. The historical legacies of
China's Tribute System, when combined with China's economic rise
since the 1980s, create some perceptions that China poses a threat in
East Asia and other regions. 24 These perceptions give China pause in
taking the lead in building new East Asian regional institutions and
processes. Given the problems that the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere caused, Japan is also reluctant to take the initiative on building
a new East Asian order. This history explains why China and Japan so
far have mainly focused on issues of global order and have spent little
time and attention on pushing for a new kind of order in East Asia. 2 5 It
might also help explain why China and Japan agree that ASEAN could
play a leading role in regional order design and corresponding practices.
Since the end of Second World War, there have been three partial
regional ordering arrangements in East Asia, namely, the U.S.-led
security system, the Japan-led economic order (the "Flying Geese"
order 26), and the ASEAN subregional order. The U.S.-led security
24. Dai Fan & Zhou Yu'e, Towards a Unified East Asian Order?, PAC. J., issue no. 12,
2005, at 22.
25. It has been argued that over the past half century, there was no original approach
to having regional ideas in East Asia because proposing such ideas was considered
imperialistic. It became taboo to debate how to create a wide-ranging order that spreads
across East Asia. See YONoSUKE HARA, NEW EAST ASIA THEORY 32 (2002).
26. In Kaname Akamatsu's view, division of labor in East Asia was based on dynamic
comparative advantage, and the underdeveloped economies in the region could be
considered to be aligned successively behind the advanced industrial nations in the order
of their different stages of growth in a wild-geese-flying pattern. In this pattern, Japan
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system in East Asia has the character of hegemonic stability, and it is
still regarded by many countries as the mainstay of East Asian stability.
In the Japan-led Flying Geese order, economic relations, especially
foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade, play the leading roles,
informed by Japan's strategic interests in the order formation. The
Flying Geese order and the ASEAN order have come of age during the
recent wave of globalization and regionalization, and they coexist with
the U.S.-led security system. East Asia has thus experienced the
influence of ASEAN's development, the political and economic rise of
Japan and China, and the preservation of U.S. security arrangements.
As a result of these overlapping regional ordering mechanisms, a
regional balance of power is taking shape.
Given the historical legacies, initiatives on regional order that go
beyond what already exists lack a long term vision and a clear roadmap.
Therefore, cooperation in East Asia, in general, lacks formal
institutionalization, especially compared with other regional orders,
such as those in Europe. In addition, a limited, but discernable, "arms
walk" has emerged in East Asia between China, Japan, and the United
States, indicating that the traditional security dilemma still hinders
further cooperation among these great powers. 27 To be clear, the
military trends around the region are not the development of armed
forces capable of invading and occupying neighboring states. Instead,
the great powers are developing capabilities to inflict damage for
intimidation, deterrence, or punishment.2 8 Accordingly, "for years to
come the Asia-Pacific will be a region that will exist somewhere between
a balance of power order and a community-based security order."29
B. Dynamics of East Asian Order Formation
1. Economic Integration and Its Spillover Effects
To date, economic integration in East Asia has experienced three
developmental phases. The period stretching from the 1960s to the
was regarded as the lead goose, while the Newly Industrializing Economies (especially
"the Four Dragons") were the second tier; after these two groups came the Philippines,
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, and finally China, Vietnam and other least developed
nations in the region. In many scholars' opinions, Japan set up a regional economic order
in East Asia based upon the Flying Geese pattern from the 1960s to the end of the 20th
century. See Kaname Akamatsu, A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing
Countries, DEVELOPING ECON., Aug. 1962, at 3.
27. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., China's Re-Emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific,
SURvIvAL, Winter 1997-98, at 65, 74.
28. Blair & Hanley, supra note 18, at 9.
29. Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama, supra note 5, at 69.
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middle of the 1990s was driven by national policies and national market
or investment reforms rather than formal cooperation under bilateral or
multilateral frameworks. Japan played the key role in regional
economic growth, especially in terms of trade and FDI. The Flying
Geese order emerged from these Japanese-led economic interactions.
The resulting expansion of trade and FDI became the engine of
economic growth and development in East Asia.
The period from 1997 to 2001 was a phase of economic coordination
triggered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. States within the
region began to take concrete cooperative and coordination measures to
respond to this crisis and prevent future severe macroeconomic
challenges. Following the crisis, East Asian countries embarked on
regional economic cooperation in the areas of trade, investment,
currency, and finance. The crisis prompted the national economies to
realize the importance of closer cooperation, because they were
increasingly interdependent, and to undertake initiatives to
institutionalize such interdependence. Thus, coordination in trade,
investment, and finance made great progress, which laid solid
foundations for future cooperation. It is in this period that China began
to play a key role in regional economic cooperation.
The third and current period started with the signing of the Chiang
Mai Initiative in May 2000. This initiative is regarded as the milestone
of East Asia's institutional economic cooperation to date. Since 2001,
economic integration in East Asia-led by the Chiang Mai Initiative-
has entered an institution- and strategy-driven phase, and the notion of
an East Asian Community is increasingly accepted by most countries in
the region. An East Asia Summit has been held twice, and many FTA
proposals have been put forward, with some becoming realities. East
Asia has become a region characterized by FTAs (see Figure 1), though
an overall FTA agreement for the region will not materialize in the near
future. In this third phase, China has emerged as the leading economic
player in East Asia.
East Asia's stability and prosperity depend on regional economic
integration, and the spillover effects of this economic integration in turn
strengthen the regional cooperation in political, security, social, and
cultural areas. All of these cause some institutional framework to
emerge in the ongoing processes. One spillover effect of economic
integration is that East Asia is being transformed as a region, and the
notion of an East Asian economic community is generally accepted as a
goal of regional cooperation. Competition between and among great
powers in the region has not led to severe conflict, crisis, or war-so
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far. 30 Instead, the great powers are more interested in further
cooperation with regional economies--obtaining preferential trade and
investment treatment-and the provision of more regional public goods.
The Asian financial crisis triggered deeper regional cooperation and
gave birth to political decisions supporting further economic integration,
which meant that the traditional crisis response of "beggar-thy-
neighbor" was not adopted. In fact, a strong sense among East Asian
leaders that the future of their countries is linked to a stable regional
and global order was enhanced, and codevelopment and cooperative
prosperity became positive driving forces of East Asian cooperation.
Figure 1. Matrix of FTAs Between/Among ASEAN Members and
China, an, and South Korea (through August 2009)
C- 4 co2 cnW - t 0 0
o. ,. -. " - P
o ® 0 ® .® 0W0 C
China M n ~ ®
Japan a A ® ® ® ® ®
South Korea a® ®A® ®®®®® ®
Philippines ®®® * ®®®®®®®® ®
Indonesia ®®®® * ®®®®®®® ®
Malaysia ®®®® ® . ®®®®®® ®
Thailand ®®A®®® m ®®®®® ®
Singapore ®®® ® ® ® ® a® ® ® ® ®
Brunei ®®®® ®®®® ®®® ®
Vietnam ®®®® ®®®®® ®® ®
Laos ®®®®®®®®®® ® ®
Cambodia ®®®®®®®®®®® * ®
Myanmar ®®®®®®®®®®®® S
Source: ASEAN, AFTA & FTAs, http://www.aseansec.org/4920.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2009).
Notes: ®=Entered into force or signed;
A =Under negotiation or agree to negotiate bilaterally;
d=Under consideration or feasibility study initiated.
30. Robert Ross, The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,
INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1999, at 81.
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2. The Comprehensive and Peaceful Rise of China
Initiating economic reform and opening to the outside world since
the late 1970s have shaped China as the fastest-growing economy in the
world. Since 1978, China has transformed itself more thoroughly and
more rapidly than any society in history. More than three decades of
high growth, generally estimated at 9.8 percent annually, have made
China the world's third largest economy and the third largest trading
nation of the world.
East Asian economies have made great contributions to China's
economic rise (see Table 2), while China, at the same time, provides
market and other economic opportunities for its neighbors. Of its
twenty-six neighboring economies in 1995, mainland China was the
largest trading partner of one neighboring economy, the second-largest
trading partner of nine neighboring economies, and the third-largest
trading partner of one neighboring economy (see Table 3). In 2005,
mainland China became the largest trading partner of nine neighboring
economies, the second-largest trading partner of seven neighboring
economies, and the third-largest trading partner of five neighboring
economies (see Table 3). Accordingly, mainland China's economic
interdependence with its neighboring economies has increased
significantly in recent years.
Table 2. FDI Flows into China (%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Hong Kong 40.7 40.6 38.1 35.7 33.9 33.1 31.3 29.8 32.1
Taiwan 6.4 6.4 5.6 6.4 7.5 6.3 5.1 3.6 3.4
Japan 7.5 7.4 7.2 9.3 7.9 9.4 9.0 10.8 7.3
South Korea 4.0 3.2 3.7 4.6 5.2 8.4 10.3 9.4 6.2
Singapore 7.5 6.6 5.3 4.6 4.4 3.8 3.3 3.7 3.6
East Asia 66.1 64.1 59.9 60.5 61.4 61.1 62.0 59.2 52.6
Source: China's Statistics Yearbook, from 1999 to 2007.
In addition, China has recently been providing more regional public
goods, such as macroeconomic stability, preferential trade treatment,
and cooperation in nontraditional security. The spillover effects of
China's economic rise became the main factors in East Asian economic
interdependence in the late 1990s. It has been noted that, "for all these
countries in Asia, China is such a large force, the only rational response
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is to figure out how to work with it." 3 1
Table 3. Trading Relations Among Mainland China and Its
Neighboring Economies
China as: 1995 2000 2005
Hong Kong,
Macao, Chinese





Second Kazakhstan, Japan, Macao, India, Laos,
Largest Kyrgyzstan, Chinese Taipei, Burma,
Trading Japan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Pakistan,




Third South Korea, Singapore,
Largest South Korea Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal,
Trading Nepal, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Partner Vietnam, and Thailand
Tajikistan
Sources: Paul Bairoch, International Industrialization Levels from 1 750
to 1980, 11 J. Eur. Econ. Hist. 269, 269-335 (1982); Angus Maddison,
The World Economy 213-20 (2006); Direction of Trade Statistics 2006
(IMF CD-ROM, 2007).
China's interest is to create a peaceful, prosperous, and stable
environment for its modernization goals, so it is now satisfied to play a
constructive and increasingly active role in the world arena and regional
integration. Accordingly, China has become a powerhouse of world
economic growth (see Table 4), the stabilizer of regional macroeconomic
prosperity, and the accelerant of regional integration.
31. Jane Perlez, China Emerges as Rival to U.S. in Asian Trade, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/world/china-emerges-as-rival-to-us-
in-asian-trade.html?scp=l&sq=&st--nyt.
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Table 4. China's Contribution to World Incremental GDP (%)
Country 1990-2005 2006-2020
China 28.14 36.6
United States 19.31 16.2
Japan 2.95 1.9
Other OECD Countries 18.33 13.8
India 9.46 11.9
Other Asian Developing Countries 7.13 7.4
Latin America 7.14 6
Source: David Dollar, Asian Century or Multi-polar Century? (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 4174, 2007), available
at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/4174.html.
Historically, rising great powers have been regarded as challengers
to the existing order and have often precipitated major wars. China's
rise has also evoked concerns from its neighbors and other major
powers, including the United States. However, China and its neighbors
have found ways of mitigating many of these concerns, principally
through a process of integrating China into the region through its
participation in a number of institutions based on the principles of
cooperation and consensus. Such institutions do not, in and of
themselves, meet all the standard security needs of member states, but
they are well suited to improving relations between states that are
neither adversaries nor allies. 32
China is a cooperative builder of the emerging regional institutions.
In the process of mutual engagement, China becomes a responsible
stakeholder within East Asia. China's policy is gradually but steadily
focused on matters that relate to what is good globally and regionally,
as well as what is needed internally. David Kang summarizes the
improvement of China's relations with its East Asian neighbors by
concluding that "[h]istorically, it has been Chinese weakness that has
led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has
been preserved. East Asia regional relations have historically been more
peaceful and more stable than those in the West. '33
32. Michael Yahuda, The Evolving Asian Order, in POWER SHIFt: CHINA AND ASIA'S
NEW DYNAMICS 347, 347 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005).
33. David C. Kang, Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,
INT'L SECURITY, Spring 2003, at 57, 66.
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China, so far, has played constructive diplomatic roles in regional
affairs.34 Its new regional posture is summarized by David Shambaugh
as participation in regional organizations, establishment of strategic
partnerships, deepening bilateral relationships, expansion of regional
economic ties, and reduction of distrust and anxiety in the security
sphere.3 5 In the realist view, the East Asian order under formation is
structurally asymmetrical and, thus, unstable. Yet, from the liberal
institutionalist perspective, China's reemergence and participation in
economic interdependence channels and shapes the evolving
environment, including the institution building that is a key factor in
order formation. From the constructivist outlook, China is being
socialized into a set of norms that will not only pacify it but also will
make Beijing a status quo power and cooperative partner.36
3. Japan's Pursuit of Greater Political Roles in Both World and
Regional Arenas
For Japan, economic growth, political stability, and security in East
Asia are critically important because of its geographical proximity.
Japan, as the second largest economy of the world, is the pioneer in
regional economic cooperation, and it remains one of the investment
powerhouses of East Asia (see Table 5). From the 1960s to the middle of
the 1990s, Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA), FDI, and
relocation of production facilities acted as driving forces of East Asia's
economic development. Japan played a comparatively dominant role in
how the region's economic order functioned. The Flying Geese order
represented both Japan's economic strength and its leading regional
role in East Asia.
Japan's economic ambitions have largely been fulfilled because it
has become the second-largest economy in the world and one of the
world's most affluent societies. Since the 1980s, however, Japan has
affirmed its strategic objective to be a great power politically. The
concept of Japan becoming a "normal nation" captured this strategic
ambition in the 1990s. In other words, Japan began to pursue the status
of a great political power to compliment its economic strength. In light
of this goal, Japan has aspirations to play a more influential role in
34. James A. Schear, Regional Conflicts: Strategies for Quelling Violence and Prospects
for Sino-U.S. Cooperation (Atlantic Council of the U.S.) Feb. 1, 2004, at 18, available at
http://www.acus.org/files/publicationpdfs/65/2004-02-RegionalConflicts.pdf.
35. David Shambaugh, China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order, INT'L
SECURITY, Winter 2004-05, at 64, 72.
36. Nicholas Khoo, Michael L.R. Smith & David Shambaugh, China Engages Asia? A
Caveat Lector, INT'L. SECURITY, Summer 2005, at 196, 210.
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regional and global affairs. In the global arena, Japan seeks increased
recognition by, for example, obtaining a permanent seat on the U.N.
Security Council. In the regional arena, it seeks to play a leading role in
defining and exploring the concept, framework, and main features of an
East Asian Community to be built in the foreseeable future.
Table 5. Japan's Outward FDI (Balance of Payments Basis, Net
and Flow)
Unit: million USD
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Asia 8447 9749 13114 7814 1811 2132 7797 8177 5028 10531 16188
ASEAN 3987 5238 7780 4454 1032 207 4013 4256 432 2800 5001
Asia NIEs 1771 3039 5228 2286 728 -686 2459 3001 31 1873 4902
ASEAN4 3312 3836 4954 3551 339 1684 2920 2166 773 2534 4276
China 3183 2317 1862 1301 360 934 2158 2622 3980 5863 6575
South
Korea 347 405 172 421 383 1074 650 437 333 771 1736
Singapore 676 1119 2559 721 595 -1521 951 1884 -457 138 556
Thailand 935 1337 2044 1668 -119 593 1594 528 678 1867 2126
Indonesia 946 1494 1570 916 199 585 481 307 484 498 1185
Malaysia 371 522 992 445 -332 -4 570 257 -504 163 525
Philippines 1061 483 349 521 591 510 275 1074 114 6 441
EU 3230 3214 2581 2268 8334 10968 17886 9770 8029 7341 7873
USA 9018 11114 7430 6013 7140 14121 7031 7441 10691 7559 12126
World 22651 23443 26057 24627 22266 31534 38495 32039 28767 30962 45461
Source: JETRO, Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics,
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/ (this table is available under
"Japan's Outward and Inward Foreign Direct Investment: FDI flow by
Country and Region, Historical Data: Outward") (last visited Oct. 14,
2009).
Notes:
1. ASEAN includes Laos and Myanmar from 1998, Cambodia from
1999;
2. Asia NIEs (Newly Industrializing Economies) include Singapore,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea;
3. ASEAN 4 includes Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia;
4. Due to the EU enlargement, the number of member states has
increased (Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995; ten accession
states in 2004);
5. Here 'World" includes countries that are not classified into each
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region, therefore World here is not necessarily equal to the sum of
regional components.
Japan has benefited from the U.S.-led regional security order that
evolved in East Asia in the post-Second World War era. But economic
developments in many East Asian countries and China's rise as an
economic powerhouse have transformed the context for regional
security. Therefore, the most important measure for Japan to take is to
redefine and reaffirm the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is regarded by the
two countries as the cornerstone of their bilateral national interests in
East Asia.
Southeast Asia is vital to Japan's economy and regional status.
Japan has further enhanced its cooperative relations with ASEAN
countries by concluding bilateral and multilateral Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with them.3 7 For Japan, FTAs play an
effective role in promoting economic integration in East Asia, which
contributes to economic growth and political and social stability, which
in turn have positive impacts for Japan. 38 In addition, Japan is eager to
establish FTAs with ASEAN members because of their political and
strategic importance to Japan. As the first mover in East Asia order
formation, Japan does not want to fall behind China in designing and
building a regional order. In 2002, then Japanese prime minister
Junichiro Koizumi put forward the vision of an enlarged East Asian
Community expanding beyond the framework of the ten-plus-three
approach, thus revealing Japanese intentions to counterbalance China's
increasing regional influence.
4. ASEAN's Leading Role and Normative Influence
ASEAN was formed in August 1967 with Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand as the founding members. By
1999, all countries in Southeast Asia had joined ASEAN, which has
become an institutional framework for the whole subregion.
ASEAN is a new model of regional cooperation and regional alliance.
In its development and evolving processes, informality and consensus
are cherished as the most important principles. The principle of
noninterference, both in affairs external to the region and internal to
37. See Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Among Japan and
Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Apr. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/economy/fta/asean/agreement.html.
38. See Shujiro Urata, Japan's FTA Strategy and a Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific, in
REVIVING JAPAN'S ECONOMY 385 (Takatoshi Ito, Hugh Patrick, & D.E. Weinstein eds.,
2005).
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ASEAN members, is rigidly implemented. Equality is of utmost
importance in ASEAN relations, and ASEAN members seek consensus
through discussion and consultation, rather than by vote or any form of
competition. All proposals are approved unanimously or not at all.
Amitav Acharya summarized this model by utilizing the term the
"ASEAN Way,"3 9 which captures the normative power of ASEAN in
dealing with regional and global issues. Through the "ASEAN Way,"
Southeast Asian countries have solved bilateral and multilateral
disputes peacefully, and have gradually built up a stable subregional
order. Compared to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia has wider cultural
and ethnic diversity. While Northeast Asia is still lacking institutions to
support common interests, Southeast Asian nations have already
established a higher sense of community within their subregion.
East Asian countries learned from the Asian financial crisis that
ASEAN countries could not solve such crises alone and that
international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund,
were not reliable. Thus, closer cooperation between Southeast and East
Asian countries became the most viable option. Since then, ASEAN's
leading role in regional integration is respected and applauded by other
countries inside and outside the region. Accordingly, ASEAN adheres to
open regionalism and appeals to cooperative development between
economies within and without the region.40 ASEAN has continued to
play a key role in institutionalizing the potential regional frameworks
for establishing a larger East Asian order, and has sought to remain at
the center of all regional initiatives as the potential rivalry for
leadership between Japan and China has intensified. ASEAN is also
taking the lead on institutionalizing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
the ten-plus-three process, and the East Asian Summits.
5. Strategic Adjustments of the United States
The United States has important interests in all corners of East
Asia, 4 1 and it attempts to safeguard its interests in the region through a
network of formal and informal institutional arrangements. In the
security area, the United States has set up a hub-spoke system in East
Asia, with the United States at the center of bilateral ties, by allying
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. As the
cornerstone of these security arrangements, the U.S.-Japan alliance was
39. See Amitav Acharya, Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the ASEAN
Way to the Asia Pacific Way?, 10 PAC. REV. 319, 328-33 (1997).
40. Masahide Shibusawa, Zakaria Haji Ahmad & Brian Bridges, PACIFIC ASIA IN THE
1990S 101 (1992).
41. Blair & Hanley, supra note 18, at 12.
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redefined in the 1990s in light- of the end of the Cold War and the
emergence of China. The United States is also active in ARF, the sole
transregional security process in East Asia. It was the U.S. withdrawal
of its armed forces from Southeast Asia in the aftermath of Vietnam
that triggered multilateral security dialogues in the region and provided
the possibility for regional security regime building. After September
11, 2001, the United States returned to Southeast Asia again, and now
plays an even more active role in East Asian security.
The United States is a major economic partner of all the East Asian
economies. East Asia's share of U.S. trade is steady at 37 to 38 percent
(see Table 6),42 and its share in U.S. FDI increased from 15 to 18
percent in recent years (see Table 7). The United States' complicated
economic relations with Japan and China always catch the eyes of the
world, and economics have become a weatherglass in measuring the
United States' overall relations with the two Asian powers.
Table 6. East Asia's Share in U.S. Trade
M -4 OD M 0 ND ca lo. 01
ASEAN 8 8 8 7 7 7 6 7 6 6 6
China 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 8 9 10 11
Japan 14 13 12 11 11 11 10 9 9 8 7
South
Korea 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: U.N. Stat. Div. - Commodity Trade Statistics Database
(COMTRADE), http://comtrade.un.org/db/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
Since the early 1990s, the United States has played a leading role in
the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum-the sole
transregional framework for economic cooperation-and has had some
success in discussing security and other noneconomic issues during
APEC and other summits with leaders of the Asia Pacific region. The
United States has decided to strengthen its economic interactions with
East Asian economies other than China and Japan, and recently it has
sought to sign bilateral FTAs with East Asian countries.
42. See Eng Chuan Ong, Anchor East Asian Free Trade in ASEAN, WASH. Q., Spring
2003, at 60 (explaining that East Asia's share of U.S. trade is broadly comparable to U.S.
NAFTA partners, and exceeds Western Europe's share).
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Table 7. U.S. FDI in East Asia (selected economies)
Unit: billion USD
01 Mo to to to 0 0 0 0 0
ASEAN 5 30 37 39 40 44 50 70 72 71 79 83
Mainland
China 3 4 5 6 9 11 12 11 11 15 17
Hong
Kong 12 14 17 18 23 27 32 40 36 35 38
Japan 37 35 34 41 55 57 56 66 58 68 75
Korea 6 7 6 7 7 9 10 12 13 17 19
Taiwan 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 n.a. 13
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Econ. Analysis,
http://bea.gov/international/dilusdbal.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
Notes:
1. "ASEAN 5" includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand;
2. The data for Indonesia from 2002-04 are not available.
The United States' most dramatic change in strategic adjustment in
East Asia involves the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations. Since the
end of the Cold War, U.S. strategy toward China has swayed between
engagement and containment.4 3 After hesitation for more than a
decade, the United States began to take a more balanced view of China's
rise. Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Robert Zoellick articulated the U.S.
vision of China as a responsible stakeholder in September 2005,
43. See Thomas Christensen, Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and
Challenges for U.S. Security Policy, INVL SECURITY, Spring 2001, at 5; see also RICHARD
BERNSTEIN & Ross MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH CHINA (1997) (predicting that
China will become a global rival of the United States within the next two decades);
Richard Bernstein & Ross Munro, Coming Conflict with America, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 1997, at 18; Peter T.R. Brookes, Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security
Relations, STRATEGIC REV., Summer 1999, at 53 (predicting that China will serve as a
peer competitor with the U.S.); Denny Roy, Hegemony on the Horizon? China's Threat to
East Asian Security, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1994, at 149 (expressing concern about
China's rise to power); but see ROBERT S. ROSS & ANDREW J. NATHAN, THE GREAT WALL
AND THE EMPTY FORTRESS: CHINA'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY (1997); Michael C. Gallagher,
China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1994, at 169
(concluding that China's military is persistently weaker than that of the United States
and other world powers); Paul Godwin, The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reactions
on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations, in CHINA'S MILITARY FACES THE
FUTURE 39 (James R. Lilley & David Shambaugh eds., 1999).
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reaffirming the U.S. commitment to engagement with China. 44
Generally speaking, the Sino-U.S. relationship is now stabilized through
bilateral channels, and engagement is the constructive path that
provides a solid foundation for bilateral strategic interaction and
multilateral dialogues.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE EAST ASIAN ORDER
Today's East Asian order is characterized by economic integration,
regional openness, intensive bilateralism and regionalism, provision of
public goods by great powers, comparatively low levels of institutional
development, and counterbalances to prevent the rise of regional
hegemony. The stability of the existing order is not, however,
guaranteed to last forever. In thinking about the future of the East
Asian order, a number of uncertainties arise.
Although the power structure in East Asia is much more balanced
than ever before, the process of economic integration has, so far, played
the decisive role in building a constructive and stable order. Efforts to
build political and security cooperation have not been as significant in
the evolution of the current order. Economic integration may not, in the
future, have such positive regional effects, as illustrated by the concern
that the multiplication of FTAs will create an adverse "spaghetti
effect"45 for the regional economy and make further economic
integration more difficult. Thus, more attention may be paid to the
development of political and security arrangements.
In terms of security, there has been gradual change and
reconstruction from hub-spoke arrangements to webs, with East Asian
countries increasingly able to manage security problems through
"shared regional norms, rising economic interdependence, and growing
institutional linkages."4 6 On the other hand, the only security-specific
process, the ARF, is simply a forum for discussion, not a formal security
and defense cooperation arrangement.4 7 The absence of such a security
regime has not yet posed severe problems for East Asian countries, but
44. Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy U.S. Sec'y of State, Whither China: From Membership
to Responsibility?, Address Before the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (Sept.
21, 2005), available at http://www.asiaing.com/whither-china-from-membership-to-
responsibility.html.
45. "Spaghetti effect" is a term used to describe an entangled condition in which
unpredictable dependencies occur among parties involved, frequently leading to
coordination breakdowns and lapses in quality control.
46. Acharya, supra note 4.
47. See Chong Guan Kwa & See Seng Tan, The Keystone of World Order, WASH. Q.,
Summer 2001, at 95, 100 (asserting that the ARF is "a security forum, or 'talk shop,' not a
defense arrangement").
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the emergence of serious security threats would be a nightmare to
address without better security arrangements and could become an
obstacle to further regional integration.
Movement toward deeper security cooperation and
institutionalization in East Asia, however, may be hampered by
problems that flow from imbalances in the region. The first imbalance is
revealed by the contrasting situations in Southeast Asia and Northeast
Asia. Even with a wider cultural and ethnic diversity compared to
Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia has already established a better
community order. By contrast, the Northeast Asian countries, especially
China, Japan, and South Korea, share more common cultural legacies,
but they do not have a comparable sense of community among
themselves and still face a traditional security dilemma similar to that
between Japan and China. Market forces will likely continue to deepen
the three economies' integration even without any further institutional
efforts. But the solution to the security dilemma needs more ideas,
innovation, political foresight, and strategic courage. A more stable
order for East Asia will be hard to create without making progress on
the security issues facing Northeast Asian countries.
The second imbalance appears in the roles that ASEAN, China, and
Japan play in regional order building. Thus far, ASEAN has played a
constructive leading role in regional order building, but its
apprehensions about the ambitions of the great powers and the low level
of institutionalization ASEAN nations favor indicate that East Asia
needs another powerhouse for order building. Cooperation between
China and Japan could be a constructive engine for regional order
building. The two countries realize that neither of them could dominate
in East Asia, but they have not yet shown a willingness to engage in
more comprehensive cooperation on security issues.
The third imbalance concerns the bilateral relations between China,
Japan, and ASEAN members. Until now, China and Japan have each
set up bilateral cooperative frameworks with ASEAN that are based on
common interests, the provision of regional and subregional public
goods, and compromise on nonstrategic self-interests. China and Japan,
on the other hand, have not taken any similar actions toward each
other. This imbalance indicates that any political rift between China
and Japan poses the most serious challenge to East Asian order
building.
The Sino-Japanese relationship is at the center of these three
imbalances. As one of the most complex relationships in the world,
economic interdependence and security distrust coexist in bilateral
relations between Japan and China. The two countries have formed
reciprocal and win-win economic relations, and the overall ambiguity of
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their relationship does not check development of further economic
interdependence. 48 Japan's capital and technologies and China's market
and economic potential are regarded as vital "special demands" for both
countries. The close economic interdependence helps prevent any
serious conflicts. Mistrust and distrust between the two countries
remain, but their bilateral interdependence still grows.
However, in my view, since China and Japan are both attempting to
rise in power and influence, strategic adjustments will be necessary,
including creation of better security arrangements in East Asia. The
change in Sino-Japanese relations since the second half of 2006 proves
the correctness of this view. China and Japan have committed
themselves to set up a bilateral strategic reciprocal relationship, and
they have reached some consensus on the contents of this new strategic
relationship:
* Support the counterpart's peaceful development to enhance
bilateral political trust;
* Deepen reciprocal cooperation to reach common development;
* Strengthen defense dialogue and communication to safeguard
and promote regional stability;
* Intensify human exchanges to enhance the mutual
understanding and friendly feelings between Chinese and
Japanese people; and
* Strengthen coordination and cooperation to meet regional and
global challenges together.
The two governments have also decided to enhance cooperation in
energy, environmental protection, agriculture, medicine, information
technologies, and other fields, and to cooperate in dealing with both
regional and global problems. The development of these more intense
bilateral relations provides new dynamics and opportunities for common
interest convergence in the region and, thus, potential regional order
building through greater institutionalization.
The new mode of Sino-Japanese bilateral relations can also support
existing East Asian institutional frameworks, such as ten-plus-three,
ARF, and the East Asia Summits, all of which previously resulted from
common interest convergence and varying degrees of
institutionalization. Among those frameworks, the ARF is the only one
focused on security, and that is expected to work as a confidence-
building measure, thus decreasing the risk of escalating security
dilemmas and promoting cooperative security. The East Asia Summit is
48. See Thomas J. Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of
China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 2006, at 81, 88-89
(explaining that while Japan has long been China's largest trading partner, the economic
relationship between the two countries is now reciprocal).
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the only super-regional framework, but East Asian countries have
different views on its functions, so it could fail to play a leading role in
dealing with regional issues. The ten-plus-three process is regarded as
the primary channel in pushing forward East Asian integration, and
East Asian states will continue to promote cooperation in the spirit of
openness, tolerance, and mutual success. In light of these realities,
strategic cooperation between and among the three Northeast Asian
countries-China, Japan, and South Korea-will be key to the
development of a future region-wide order for East Asia.
In a sense, China and Japan are ready for regional order building,
although they compete for regional leadership. The two countries are
active in regional cooperative frameworks, and they have been
implementing additional proposals of regional cooperation. Japan and
China increasingly realize that fierce competition restricts their
strategic interests and that moving towards a stronger bilateral
cooperative framework based on common interests would be the feasible
route to solve existing imbalances and advance regional order building.
All things considered, Japan and China have an unprecedented
opportunity to advance East Asian order and stability through
expanding their common interests and engaging in deeper
institutionalization of their relationship.
V. A COMMON INTERESTS-BASED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
The Sino-Japanese relationship is very complex, featuring a long
history of friendly relations and deep strategic distrust and mistrust.
Both countries have recently realized that they must address their
bilateral issues within a broader regional and global perspective. The
transformation of East Asia as a region, made possible by the impact of
regional integration and globalization, provides the necessary conditions
for positive development of Sino-Japanese relations. Moving forward,
Japan and China should work to develop a bilateral strategic framework
built on convergence of common interests and better institutionalization
of the East Asian order.
A. The Complex Sino-Japanese Relationship
As one of the most complex bilateral relationships in the world,
Sino-Japanese relations affect not only the two countries themselves,
but also the entire East Asian region and the whole world. Historical
legacies, political mistrust, and security distrust lead to complex
dilemmas between China and Japan. Conversely, close economic
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cooperation and common security concerns indicate that
interdependence between the two countries also exists. In this
relationship, complexity contains both negative and positive aspects.
Although there are 236 sister-city agreements between China and
Japan and human traffic between the countries is significant (more
than 5.5 million persons in 2008), historical legacies still weigh heavy
on the minds of the Chinese and Japanese people, which is reflected in
fragile sentiments and complicated public opinions in both China and
Japan.
Economic interdependence between China and Japan has been
enhanced, and the two countries enjoy ever-closer economic ties. Their
bilateral trade volume in 2008 reached U.S.$266.78 billion, and Japan's
investment in China was U.S.$65.38 billion by the end of 2008, second
only to Hong Kong. The cumulative total of Japan's overseas
development assistance to China from 1979 to 2007 reached to 288.89
trillion Yen, and 41,162 Japanese projects were implemented in
mainland China by the end of 2008.4 9 In a word, Japan has been and
continues to be an indispensable source of China's capital, technology,
and, to a lesser extent, an export outlet.
China's economic rise provides Japan with even more opportunities.
China today is the leading exporter of products to Japan and the second
largest destination for Japanese exports. China's economic development
has so far played a positive role in the recent revival of Japan's
economic growth, demonstrating the codevelopment that is achieved in
their bilateral economic relations. Such interdependence would be costly
to discontinue for either side and acts as a deterrent to severe conflict.
Yet, in political and security terms, both countries have been beset
by antagonisms and deep-seated suspicions, which magnify the
implications of run-of-the-mill disputes, such as those involving the
Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea. Bilateral relations are often
mixtures of hot economics and cold politics, and Sino-Japanese relations
exhibit this mixture. In the broader picture, although distrust remains,
bilateral interdependence continues to grow, and the two governments
are showing a desire to see an improvement in their bilateral relations.
Accordingly, to portray Sino-Japanese relations as a zero-sum game
would be misleading, and any account that does not account for the de
facto economic interdependence and political adjustments already made
between Japan and China would be myopic.
In dealing with regional affairs, China's and Japan's respective
desires for a larger role have become principal catalysts in shaping a
49. See Ministry of Foreign Aff., China's Relations with Japan, http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_25/sbgx (P.R.C.) (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
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new order in East Asia. Japan worries about possible Chinese
dominance of East Asia, while China worries that the strategic ties
between the United States and Japan will impair its ability to achieve
key national interests. Regional institutions, therefore, can play a
catalytic role in maximizing gains from economic exchange and helping
diffuse mistrust in the security arena. In other words, regional
cooperative frameworks could provide wide channels for Sino-Japanese
bilateral coordination and dialogue.
Most countries in the region expect the improvement of Sino-
Japanese relations, which would then be a driving force for further
regional cooperation. China and Japan realize that dominance by any
single country would not be welcomed in East Asia. Thus, the most
effective way to safeguard their vital national interests is to act as the
stakeholders in the region and play responsible roles within the regional
frameworks. Competition between the two cannot be avoided all the
time, and win-win results will not always be reached in bilateral
relations. Nevertheless, Japan and China have growing opportunities to
avoid the type of zero-sum outcomes that lead to political problems and
potential conflicts.
B. Common Interests Between China and Japan
China and Japan are in the process of making mutual adjustments.
Many strategists predict that the next ten years will be the moment of
truth for Sino-Japanese relations. The best outcome would be
establishment of a comprehensive framework for coordination and
cooperation, with strategic trust at the center. Given the complexity of
Sino-Japanese relations, the practical measure to take is to set up a
strategic framework based on common interests, and hopefully strategic
trust would be produced through the framework, step by step.
Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe proposed building a
relationship of strategic reciprocity with China shortly after he took
office in September 2006. It was the first time that a Japanese leader
used the word "strategic" to describe Sino-Japanese relations, and many
experts regarded it as a great turn in Japan's policy toward China. In
the spring of 2007, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to
Japan, during which the two governments reached important consensus
on the content of their new strategic relations. In my understanding,
this bilateral relationship of strategic reciprocity means a reciprocal
relationship based on common strategic interests-a comprehensive,
long term, and stable bilateral relationship that moves beyond limited,
tactical cooperation.
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Table 8. A Common Interests-Based
Sino-JaDanese Relations
Strategic Framework for
National Level Bilateral Level
Nonindependence of Taiwan; To
cooperate in efforts to ensure that To enhance political coordination
Political cross-strait relations do not via certain mechanisms;
Dimension escalate tensions; To keep routine exchange visits of
Both adhere to the road of top leaders.
peaceful development.
To facilitate bilateral trade and
investment;
Economic China manages to keep macro- Tovexpnenti
Dimesio ecnomi stbilty.To expand and utilize bilateralDimension economic stability, cnmccmleetrte o
economic complementarities for
further economic cooperation.
To maintain and strengthen
Security bilateral strategic dialogues;
Dimension To enhance exchanges between
bilateral military circles.
To push forward study on
historical issues so to prevent
Cultural historical issues from hindering
Dimension present relations;
To enhance cultural exchanges
and mutual understanding.
To enhance nongovernmental
Social interaction such as tourism and
Dimension academic and youth exchanges,
laying solid foundations for
bilateral relations.
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Regional Level Global Level
To coordinate in regional political To set up dialogue mechanisms on
dialogues and cooperation; global issues of common concern
Political To coordinate to maintain
Dimension regional cooperation and its main and take an open attitude on theissues vital to the core interest of
features as openness, inclusivity the o th sie
and progressiveness.
To push forward regional and
subregional (China, Japan, and
South Korea) trade and
Economic investment;Dimension To maintain regional
macroeconomic and financial
stability;
To facilitate financial market
development.
To resolve and prevent regional To resolve and prevent regional
conflicts on the Korean Peninsula; conflicts on the Korean Peninsula;
To cooperate in subregional To cooperate in dealing with state
Security energy security by protecting the
Dimension common petroleum transit-, fa raeTo cooperate in dealing with
To cooperate in dealing with
various nontraditional securityvarious nontraditional security polm.i
problems.[']b
To push forward study onCultural
Dimension historical issues among China,
Japan and South Korea.
Social To enhance nongovernmental
Dimension interaction such as tourism and
academic exchanges.
1] Nontraditional security problems include, but are not limited to:
terrorism; preventing transnational crime, such as drug trafficking,
piracy, money laundering, and corruption; human security issues like
aging, communicable disease control, environmental protection, and
natural disaster response; and clean energy.
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A key challenge in making this strategic reciprocity work is to
define common interests between China and Japan. The central task for
Chinese and Japanese decision makers is to define expectations for the
future of Sino-Japanese relations in the context of globalization and
regionalization. The agenda for such a relationship must be defined
more broadly and strategically than simply returning to the issues of
Japan's historical legacies, the Taiwan issue, and Chinese
nationalism. 50 It requires adding other regional and global concerns. In
sum, Sino-Japanese strategic reciprocal relations must be centered on
common interests that address bilateral concerns, regional challenges,
and global issues. Table 8 summarizes the basic common interests
between the two countries and indicates that the convergence and
institutionalization of regional common interests are vital to the
bilateral strategic framework (see Table 8 on previous pages).
In the above strategic framework, the national and bilateral levels
should be regarded as where the basic interests reside, which reflects
the importance of bilateral reciprocity. The regional level should be the
center of the framework, meaning that common interests are not based
only on the pursuit of reciprocal benefits, but also on dealing with
common threats together. The global level should reflect the strategic
vision of these two great powers, and the openness of East Asian
regionalism should allow the two countries to consider global interests
in decision making and framework design.
The above bilateral, common interests-based strategic framework is
an ideal type, which would need to be adjusted and expanded with the
development of Sino-Japanese relations. In other words, when we
analyze common interests in the bilateral relationship, we should focus
not only on the structural aspects, which would be the foundation for
bilateral relations, but also on the process elements, which would, over
time, become more important in the future of Sino-Japanese relations.
However, there are undeniable zero-sum factors in Sino-Japanese
relations, such as historical legacies and the disputes over the Diaoyu
Islands and the East China Sea. Disputes and conflicts always coexist
with cooperation and pursuit of common interests in bilateral and
multilateral relations. This dynamic should be regarded as the dialectic
of contemporary international relations. Disputes and conflicts should
not stand in the way of the pursuit of common interests, and the
mitigation and reasonable resolution of disputes and conflicts will, of
course, enhance the promotion of common interests.
50. See Scott Snyder, Introduction: Prospects for a China-Japan-U.S. Trilateral
Dialogue, in NEW DIMENSIONS OF CHINA-JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS 11, 19-20 (Japan Ctr. for
Int'l Exchange ed., 1999) (citing the importance of identifying issues of mutual interest in
the context of Sino-Japanese dialogue).
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C. Feasible Strategic Measures to Pursue
China's and Japan's respective cooperation with ASEAN indicate
that both countries have accumulated rich experiences in building
strategic frameworks through common interest convergence and
institutionalization. The White Paper on the "Peaceful Development
Road of China," as well as recent speeches by top Chinese leaders, show
that China wants to enhance cooperation with neighboring countries
based on common interests.5 1Accordingly, a combination of pragmatic
accommodation, normative convergence, economic interaction, and some
strategic hedging currently takes place between China and most of its
neighbors. As Shambaugh observed, "China and ASEAN are forging a
productive and lasting relationship that is gradually erasing a history
built on widespread suspicion, painful memories, and lingering
tensions."52
As Ryosei Kokubun points out, Japan's reemergence and China's
development support each other, yet genuine understandings on many
issues are missing between the two countries. In principle, the main
route for improving Sino-Japanese relations is to bring bilateral
coordination efforts into the processes of East Asian order building, thus
enhancing bilateral strategic reciprocity in both regional and global
arenas. In practice, to transcend the present mistrust and
misperception, the two countries first need to make more determined
efforts to understand the changes taking place within the other country
and to engage in policy responses that can lead to mutual
understanding and trust. Second, the two countries could take measures
to build bilateral, institutionalized trust through transparency, strategic
dialogues, and other confidence-building measures. Third, the two
countries could pursue measures to set up a consulting mechanism for
use in dealing with multilateral issues of mutual concern.
CONCLUSION
The convergence and institutionalization of common interests can
provide a workable way to build a constructive East Asian regional
order. East Asia has a long history of attempts to establish order in the
region. Today, East Asian countries embrace both globalization and
regionalization, and they are beginning to think more seriously about
the future regional order framework. Regional integration and its
51. Mori Kazuko, East Asia Community and China, INT'L AFF., May 2006, at 4.
52. Shambaugh, supra note 35, at 76 (citing Alice D. Ba, China and ASEAN.
Reinvigorating Relations for the 21st Century, ASIAN SURVEY, July-Aug. 2003, at 622).
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spillover effects, China's comprehensive and peaceful rise, Japan's
political pursuit of a greater role in both regional and world arenas,
ASEAN's influence, and the United States' strategic adjustments in the
region are the main dynamics in East Asian order formation. These
dynamics in turn determine not only the openness of the regional order
but also the processes and roadmap for continued order building. East
Asia has established or participates in useful institutional frameworks
at subregional, regional, and super-regional levels, all of which advance
common interest convergence and institutionalization.
Foresight tells us that Sino-Japanese relations are crucial to the
future of East Asia order. China and Japan appear increasingly ready
for more regional order building, but they realize that their fierce
competition restricts their strategic interests. Setting up a bilateral
cooperative framework based on their common interests would be the
only feasible route. The existing strategic reciprocal relationship
between China and Japan mainly deals with bilateral relations,
especially how to stabilize the bilateral relationship. The next steps are
to connect this bilateral strategic reciprocal relationship with other
regional strategies, thus forming an overall common interest framework
for East Asia. Moving in this direction would represent progress in East
Asian order formation.
For China and Japan, this vision is not only a great challenge, but it
is also an unprecedented opportunity. Great nations must think before
they act. It is high time for China and Japan to begin thinking more
clearly about their interests and responsibilities nationally, regionally,
and globally and to act on strategic choices that benefit their people,
Asia, and the entire world.
